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China’s Strategic Shift: Prioritizing U.S. Counteraction Over North Korea’s Denuclearization

Pyongyang: China appeared more focused on countering U.S. regional influence than on addressing North Korea's nuclear program, given the absence of any public reference to Pyongyang's denuclearization in either country's readout of their summit this week, experts said Tuesday.

According to Yonhap News Agency, the summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Pyongyang on Monday underlined a deepening strategic alignment between the two countries and their unity amid an intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry over trade, security, and other areas. Xi's visit to the North Korean capital marked his first trip to the country since 2019, as Beijing was seen striving to strengthen relations with Pyongyang, which has drawn closer to Russia through deepening military, diplomatic, and economic cooperation.

Patrick Cronin, chair for Asia-Pacific security at the Hudson Institute, remarked that China is more focused on denying U.S. influence than denying North Korea nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, Andrew Yeo, SK-Korea Foundation chair at the Brookings Institution's Center for East Asia Policy Studies, noted the absence of any reference to denuclearization on the summit day, suggesting that the issue is not a top priority for China as it may have been a decade ago.

Xi's high-profile meeting with Kim followed his summit talks with U.S. President Donald Trump in Beijing last month, where the White House stated both leaders confirmed their "shared goal" of denuclearizing North Korea. However, state media reports from both countries lacked any public reference to denuclearization, raising questions about a potential shift in China's approach to the reclusive state's nuclear quandary.

Ellen Kim, director of academic programs at Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI), explained that China's policy ambiguity on the denuclearization issue began emerging in 2024, driven by several factors, indicating China's new priority on advancing its strategic interests in the region. These factors include China's move to avoid actions that might provoke North Korea amid concerns that closer Pyongyang-Moscow ties could weaken China's influence over North Korea.

Cronin emphasized that through the summit, China reinforced a key message: unity with its traditional ally, showcasing a united front capable of standing up to the United States and its allies. This display of unity, however, masked the leaders' divergent interests in some areas, although they showed determination to create a "more favorable balance of power" in Northeast Asia.

From a geopolitical perspective, Kim of the KEI posited that the North Korea-China summit was part of Beijing's efforts to reassert its influence over Pyongyang, enhance strategic alignment with North Korea and Russia, and counterbalance pressures from the U.S. and Japan. For Kim Jong-un, the summit was a strategic move to bolster his regime's identity as a member of the nuclear-power club.

The KEI scholar noted that Kim sought China's endorsement of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, which he received through China's silence on denuclearization issues. This silence may inadvertently prompt South Korea to reassess China's strategic value as a partner.

Yeo highlighted the significance of the Pyongyang meeting for Kim, emphasizing North Korea's growing relevance in regional affairs. The regime entered the summit from a position of greater security and diplomatic confidence, underscoring Kim's standing as a leader courted by both China and Russia.

Rob Rapson, former acting U.S. ambassador to South Korea, described the Xi-Kim summit as another "notable data point in the continuum of evolving Northeast Asia geopolitics/economics." He noted that Xi's omission of the denuclearization issue suggests the nuclear issue will need to be finessed for any prospect of future reengagement between the U.S. and North Korea.

Rapson speculated that U.S. President Donald Trump might make another strong push to meet with Kim, if only for legacy purposes, although time and opportunity are running out given the limited time remaining in Trump's presidency and the range of domestic and foreign policy challenges he faces. Meanwhile, Pyongyang has shown little interest in resuming dialogue with Washington, particularly as it has deepened cooperation with Moscow.

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